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CLARITY AND CONFUSION:  
DID REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN  
REVIVE STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTIONS 
OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY? 
MARK J. CHORAZAK 
INTRODUCTION 
For Maria Altmann, a Holocaust survivor in her late eighties, 
1938 is not just a year. It marked the beginning of the “Anschluss,” 
the Nazi invasion and annexation of her native Austria, and her 
family’s subsequent flight from Vienna.1 More than sixty years later, 
following a discovery by a journalist conducting research in the state 
archives at the Austrian Gallery,2 Altmann learned that six Gustav 
Klimt paintings that she thought had been donated to the Gallery by 
her uncle had actually been confiscated from him by the Nazis and 
transferred to the Gallery under a cover letter signed “Heil Hitler.”3 
After the Republic of Austria rejected her proposals for private 
arbitration, and after litigating in Austrian courts proved overly 
burdensome, Altmann brought suit against Austria in a Los Angeles 
federal district court.4 Austria moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that 
it was entitled to sovereign immunity because the alleged conduct 
occurred before the United States codified its policy of restrictive 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Mark J. Chorazak. 
 1. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 684. The Austrian federal minister opened the Gallery’s archives to the journalist, 
Hubertus Czernin, along with other researchers, following a controversy surrounding two 
paintings by Egon Schiele. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001). See generally United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002) (discussing the controversy surrounding the Schiele 
paintings). The Schiele controversy, which has generated protracted litigation, “has created a 
bombshell in the art world.” MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR 
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 226 (2003). 
 3. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684. 
 4. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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immunity in 1976 and even before it adopted the policy in 1952.5 In 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Supreme Court disagreed and 
allowed Altmann’s claim to proceed.6 
Altmann’s case is one of many brought by private plaintiffs 
seeking redress in American courts against foreign states.7 The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),8 which provides 
the “sole basis” for bringing suit against a foreign state in an 
American court,9 enumerates several exceptions to foreign states’ 
traditionally recognized immunity as sovereigns. The question before 
the Court in Altmann was whether the FSIA should apply 
retroactively to conduct that occurred before the United States 
articulated its policy of restrictive sovereign immunity, by which 
immunity is limited to those suits involving a foreign sovereign’s 
public, not private or commercial, acts.10 Several governments, 
including the United States,11 Mexico,12 and Japan,13 filed amicus briefs 
warning that retroactive applicability would threaten foreign states’ 
reasonable and settled expectations of immunity from suit for pre-
1952 conduct. The Court concluded, however, that the doctrine of 
 
 5. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 686. Austria raised additional defenses, including improper venue 
and dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but these were rejected by the Ninth 
Circuit and not considered in the Supreme Court’s opinion, see id. at 686 n.6 (noting that 
Austria raised these defenses); thus, they will not be discussed further in this Note. 
 6. Id. at 700. 
 7. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 241 (2d Cir. 
1996), recalled and remanded, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2338 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1997), cert. denied 
520 U.S. 1204 (1997) (suit against Libya for sponsoring terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103); 
Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded, 72 
Fed. Appx. 850 (2d Cir. 2003) (suit by Polish Jews against a Polish government agency for post–
World War II expropriations); Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 175 F. 
Supp. 2d 423, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 389 F.3d 61 (2004), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1841 (2005) 
(suit against a French national railroad for actions taken in transporting Jews to death camps 
during the Holocaust); Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d 332 F.3d 679 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), reaff’d 413 F.3d 45 (2005) (suit by Asian women against Japan for damages 
from alleged sexual slavery and torture by Japanese military). Both Abrams and Joo were 
reconsidered in light of Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–32, 1441, 1602–11 (2005). 
 9. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). 
 10. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 692. 
 11. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Altmann, 541 
U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22811828, at *10. 
 12. Brief for Mexico as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 
(No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22766741, at *3. 
 13. Brief for Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 
(No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22753584, at *7. 
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foreign sovereign immunity “reflects current political realities and 
relationships” and that retroactivity is consistent with the dual 
purposes of the FSIA: to “clarify[] the rules that judges should apply 
in resolving sovereign immunity claims and eliminate[] political 
participation in the resolution of such claims.”14 The Court also 
indicated that the State Department, in FSIA cases, could once again 
file “suggestions of immunity,” which are recommendations that a 
federal court dismiss a suit against a foreign state for lack of 
jurisdiction.15 
This Note argues that although the Court in Altmann provided 
lower courts with much-needed clarity in holding that the FSIA is 
permissibly retroactive, it erred in inviting the State Department to  
once again file suggestions of immunity. Most importantly, this Note 
contributes to the literature by arguing that, although applying the 
FSIA retroactively may bring hope to those plaintiffs who have 
“nowhere else to go” and headaches to the State Department because 
it resurrects suggestions of immunity, Altmann is unlikely either to 
dramatically expose foreign states to viable suits or to lead to the dire 
consequences that have been predicted for the United States’ conduct 
of its foreign relations.16 
Part I of this Note offers a review of the central tenets of 
sovereign immunity, from its common law roots to its current 
statutory construction. Part II briefly reviews the patchwork of 
conflicting interpretations of the FSIA within the case law before 
introducing Altmann. Part III analyzes how Altmann’s reinforcement 
of the FSIA as a jurisdictional statute resolves the split that was 
emerging within the circuits by neither violating the legal principles of 
retroactivity nor contravening the spirit of restrictive sovereign 
immunity. Finally, Part IV explores Altmann’s implications for 
plaintiffs, foreign states, and the State Department before concluding 
that the Court should clarify when courts should defer to State 
Department suggestions of immunity. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The United States’ approach to sovereign immunity can be 
traced by looking at three periods: first, the Nation’s founding era, 
 
 14. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696, 699. 
 15. Id. at 701. 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
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when foreign states enjoyed “absolute” immunity from suit; second, 
between 1952 and 1976, when the “Tate Letter” set forth a more 
“restrictive” policy of sovereign immunity; and third, since 1976, 
when the FSIA was enacted to codify the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity. 
A. From Absolute to Restrictive Sovereignty Immunity 
The United States’ initial policy of according foreign states 
absolute immunity from suit has its roots in The Schooner Exchange 
v. M’Faddon.17 In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the 
jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory “is 
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.” As a matter of 
comity and the need to maintain diplomatic relations, however, 
members of the international community had implicitly agreed to 
waive the exercise of jurisdiction over other sovereigns in certain 
classes of cases, such as those involving foreign ministers or the 
person of the sovereign, who, Marshall observed, were immune from 
suit when acting “with the knowledge and license of [their] 
sovereign.”18 Thus, courts almost automatically dismissed suits against 
foreign states under the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.19 
In 1952, the United States departed from its practice of granting 
absolute sovereign immunity, granting instead only limited 
immunity.20 The shift was motivated, in large measure, by acceptance 
in the international community of what has become known as the 
“restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity; the emerging role of 
nation-states as participants in commercial affairs; and the fact that 
 
 17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 18. Id. at 136, 137; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) 
(“For more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted foreign sovereigns 
complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country.”). 
 19.  Dismissal was especially common in sensitive cases, such as those involving friendly 
nations. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–88 (1943) (noting that claims against 
friendly foreign states are “normally presented and settled in the course of the conduct of 
foreign affairs by the President and the Department of State” and that “[i]n such cases the 
judicial department of [the] government follows the action of the political branch, and will not 
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction”). The State Department would 
file a suggestion of immunity with a federal court and the court would, in turn, dismiss the suit, a 
procedure that lasted for the next 165 years after The Schooner Exchange. Enahoro v. 
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 20. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B. 
Perlman (May 19, 1962), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–
15 (1976). 
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the United States had already subjected itself to suits in foreign courts 
in tort, contract, and merchant vessel disputes.21 In a letter to Acting 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman by Acting Legal Adviser to the 
Secretary of State Jack B. Tate, the State Department observed that 
there was broadening support within the international community for 
extending immunity to foreign states only for their sovereign or 
public acts—jure imperii—and not for their commercial or private 
acts—jure gestionis.22 The “Tate Letter,”23 as it is known, expressly 
adopted this “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity and noted 
that it “[would] be the [State] Department’s practice to advise [the 
Justice Department] of all requests by foreign governments for the 
grant of immunity from suit and of the Department’s [opinion].”24 
Such an approach for determining whether a foreign state was 
immune from suit seemed straightforward. In application, however, it 
proved problematic.25 
B. From Case-by-Case Political Pressures to Apolitical 
Determinations under the FSIA 
The weaknesses of restrictive immunity under the Tate Letter 
were twofold. First, it failed to empower courts to make immunity 
determinations because “[a]s in the past, initial responsibility for 
deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon the 
Executive acting through the State Department,” which continued 
issuing suggestions of immunity to courts.26 Worse still, foreign states, 
no longer afforded absolute immunity from suit, began placing 
diplomatic pressure on the State Department to file favorable 
suggestions with courts.27 The result was that political considerations 
sometimes influenced the State Department to intervene “in cases 
 
 21. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714 (citing the Tate Letter for the proposition that other 
nation-states “adhering to the [restrictive] theory” was “most persuasive” in convincing the 
United States to change its policy, and also noting the “widespread and increasing practice on 
the part of governments [to engage] in commercial activities”). 
 22. Id. at 711. 
 23. Id. at 698. 
 24. Id. at 714–15. 
 25. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (explaining 
how application of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity “proved troublesome” because 
“foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department in seeking 
immunity”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive 
theory.”28 Second, the Tate Letter failed to provide any clear standard 
for courts to follow in making immunity determinations when foreign 
states did not request immunity from the State Department.29 Instead, 
courts had only prior State Department decisions to guide them, and 
these decisions had applied the restrictive theory inconsistently.30 The 
practical effect of these problems was troubling—questions as to a 
foreign state’s sovereign immunity were being determined by two 
different branches and without a clear standard of when immunity 
should be recognized.31 
In 1976, Congress codified the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity in the FSIA.32 Although adopting the general rule that 
foreign states are immune from jurisdiction in the federal courts, the 
FSIA delineates exceptions under which a suit may be brought 
against a foreign state or one of its agencies or instrumentalities.33 
These exceptions include when a foreign state (1) has waived its 
immunity either explicitly or by implication, (2) acts in a commercial 
capacity, (3) expropriates property in violation of international law 
and in some commercial capacity affecting the United States, (4) is 
involved in a matter in which rights in real estate acquired by 
inheritance or gift are at issue, (5) is a party to a personal or property 
injury action occurring in the United States, (6) has consented to 
arbitration, (7) is involved in a personal injury action arising from 
terrorist acts the state has sponsored in the United States, or (8) is 
subject to suit in admiralty for enforcement of a maritime lien based 
upon the foreign state’s commercial activity.34 Put simply, if a claim 
does not fall within one of these exceptions, a federal court must 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the foreign state. 
In enacting the FSIA, Congress envisaged that its 
“comprehensive set of legal standards” would accomplish the 
following objectives: free the State Department from “case-by-case 
diplomatic pressures”; clarify for courts the standards to apply in 
making immunity determinations; and assure litigants that, by placing 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 487–88. 
 30. Id. at 487. 
 31. Id. at 488. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7), (b) (2000).  
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primary responsibility with the judiciary and not the executive, 
immunity determinations would be made on legal, rather than 
political, grounds.35 Lower courts have differed, however, as to 
whether Congress, in codifying the restrictive theory in the FSIA, 
intended it to apply to acts occurring prior to 1952, when the 
restrictive theory was adopted. 
Until the Supreme Court decided Altmann, there was a 
patchwork of conflicting opinions within the lower courts. For 
example, district courts in Illinois36 and California37 held that the FSIA 
did apply retroactively, whereas a district court in the District of 
Columbia38 ruled that it did not. And among the courts of appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit’s view, that it is permissible to apply the FSIA to pre-
1952 conduct,39 clearly differed from the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits’40 
position that the FSIA should not be so applied. The Second Circuit 
simply endorsed an approach of having district courts broadly seek 
“case-by-case recommendations” by the State Department,41 thereby 
encouraging a return to the sort of analysis employed before the 
FSIA was enacted. The Court sought to resolve these differences by 
granting certiorari in Altmann.42 
II.  THE ALTMANN CASE 
Altmann is one of the most important recent decisions in 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Essentially, Altmann attempts to 
resolve the question of whether a suit, involving a unique and 
historically significant set of facts arising in the twentieth century, 
may be brought in the twenty-first century against a foreign state in a 
federal court. 
 
 35. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606).  
 36. Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland), 68 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Ill. 
1999). 
 37. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  
 38. Yin v. Government of Japan, No. 92-2574, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6061, at *6 (D.D.C. 
May 6, 1994). 
 39. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 40. Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 
794 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 41. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72 F. App’x 850, 854 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 42. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 539 U.S. 987, 987 (2003). 
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A. Bringing Suit against Austria 
Maria Altmann’s uncle, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, was a wealthy 
sugar magnate and prominent patron of the arts.43 Bloch-Bauer fled 
Austria after it was annexed by the Nazis in 1938. His sugar company 
was “Aryanized.”44 His palatial Vienna home was taken over and his 
vast art and porcelain collections were confiscated.45 
Before the war, Bloch-Bauer and his wife, Adele, were friends of 
the famous painter Gustav Klimt.46 Adele was a subject of two of the 
six Klimt paintings that Bloch-Bauer owned.47 Considered important 
symbols of Austrian culture,48 the six paintings are valued at 
approximately $150 million.49 All but one of these paintings have been 
hanging in the Austrian National Gallery for over fifty years.50 
Altmann is her uncle’s sole surviving heir.51 Although her aunt, 
Adele, who died in 1925, executed a will “ask[ing]” that her husband 
bequeath five of the six paintings at issue to the Austrian National 
Gallery after his death, he never did so.52 Bloch-Bauer died soon after 
the war ended in 1945, the same year that Altmann became an 
American citizen.53 In his will, Bloch-Bauer left his entire estate to 
Altmann and her two siblings.54 
In 1946, Austria invalidated all Aryanizations of property, but 
required exiled Austrians to seek “export permits” of “artworks . . . 
deemed to be important to [Austria’s] cultural heritage.”55 These 
permits, however, were often used by the Austrian government to 
“forc[e] Jews to donate or trade valuable artworks to the [Gallery] in 
 
 43. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 680–81 (2004). 
 44. Id. at 682. “Aryanization” refers to the process by which “Jews were forced to sell their 
property to ‘Aryans’ at artificially low prices.” United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99-9940, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, *3–*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (internal citation omitted); RAUL 
HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 95 (1961). 
 45. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 682. 
 46. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 240–41. 
 47. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681. 
 48.    BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 241. 
 49. Id. at 240–41. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681. 
 52. Id. at 681–82. 
 53. Id. at 681. 
 54. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 241. 
 55. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 682–83. 
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exchange for export permits for other works.”56 The following year, 
Altmann and her fellow heirs hired a Viennese lawyer to recover 
property stolen from their uncle during the war.57 In exchange for 
signing a document “acknowledg[ing] and accept[ing]” the validity of 
Austria’s claim to the Klimt paintings, the heirs’ lawyer secured an 
export permit for most of the remainder of Bloch-Bauer’s collection.58 
Altmann, however, was never aware of this arrangement and, until 
1998, thought that her aunt and uncle had “freely donated” the Klimt 
paintings to the Gallery.59 
In 1998, a journalist conducting research in the Austrian 
Gallery’s archives discovered documents showing that the Gallery 
had known that neither Bloch-Bauer nor his wife had donated the 
paintings to the Gallery.60 The journalist also found that one of the 
most famous paintings in the collection, Adele Bloch-Bauer I, had 
repeatedly been referenced in Gallery publications as having been 
donated by Altmann’s uncle in 1936 when it had actually been 
transferred to the Gallery by the Nazis.61 
Once these findings were made public, Austria enacted a new 
law to return artworks that had been coercively donated to state 
museums.62 Under this law, Altmann successfully recovered several 
Klimt drawings and porcelain settings that had been donated after the 
war.63 Altmann failed to recover, however, the six Klimt paintings, 
which Austria claimed had been properly donated under Adele’s 
will.64 After Austria declined Altmann’s request for private 
arbitration, she brought suit in Austria.65 Because pursuing the suit in 
Austria would have been prohibitively expensive,66 Altmann instead 
 
 56. Id. at 683. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 684. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 244–45. 
 66. Under Austrian law, plaintiffs are required to deposit a filing fee proportional to the 
value sought; Altmann’s request for a waiver of the almost two million dollar fee was denied. Id. 
at 245. 
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sought recovery of the paintings in a federal district court in Los 
Angeles in 2000.67 
Austria moved to dismiss the case on the ground of absolute 
sovereign immunity.68 In 2001, the district court denied Austria’s 
motion, holding that the FSIA, which contained an exception to 
sovereign immunity for cases involving expropriations, applied to pre-
1952 events.69 In 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that 
Austria could not have reasonably expected to receive immunity for 
its World War II–era actions.70 Austria then appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which granted certiorari in 2003.71 In January 2006, more than 
a year and a half after the Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann, an 
Austrian arbitration court ordered Austria to return five Klimt 
paintings to Altmann and her family.72 
B. Shifting Boundaries: The FSIA Can Be Applied Retroactively 
In Altmann, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
denial of Austria’s motion to dismiss, holding that the FSIA applies to 
all claims against foreign sovereigns, “regardless of when the 
underlying conduct occurred.”73 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stevens noted that, by requiring courts to apply the FSIA’s sovereign 
immunity rules in all cases, the Court’s holding was consistent with 
the FSIA’s central purpose—to clarify the rules judges should apply 
in immunity determinations and to remove political participation 
from the process.74 
The Court first explained75 why it expressly disagreed with the 
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Landgraf v. USI Film Products.76 In 
Landgraf, the Court set out the general rule that laws conferring 
substantive rights or obligations have no retroactive effect absent an 
 
 67. Id. at 245. 
 68. Id. at 246. 
 69. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 70. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 539 U.S. 987 (2003). 
 72. Diane Haithman & Christopher Reynolds, Court Awards Nazi-Looted Artworks to 
L.A. Woman, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A1.   
 73. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 697–700 (2004). 
 74. Id. at 699. 
 75. Id. at 692 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)). 
 76. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
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express statutory command.77 In those cases in which a law contains 
no express command, Landgraf requires a court to determine 
whether the new law would have an impermissible retroactive effect 
in practice.78 The Court did not criticize the Landgraf inquiry into 
whether a law affects substantive rights or only matters of procedure, 
but instead noted that the inquiry failed to provide a clear answer 
because the FSIA “defies such categorization.”79 Even though “the 
FSIA is not simply a jurisdictional statute . . . but a codification of ‘the 
standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of 
substantive federal law,”80 the Court held in Altmann that the central 
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity is not to allow foreign states 
to “shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity 
from suit.”81 Instead, sovereign immunity “reflects current political 
realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states and their 
instrumentalities some present ‘protection from the inconvenience of 
suit as a gesture of comity.’”82 
Looking to the FSIA’s language and overall structure, the Court 
found an “unambiguous” statement in the preamble that claims 
against foreign states were “‘henceforth’ to be decided . . . ‘in 
conformity with the principles set forth’” in the FSIA and also found 
that many of the other provisions were “unquestionably” meant to 
apply retroactively.83 Thus, the Court reasoned that retroactive 
application of the FSIA was also consistent with congressional 
intent.84 
Finally, the Court stressed the “narrowness” of its holding, 
noting that several defenses, such as the act-of-state doctrine,85 would 
remain available to Austria.86 Although the Court concluded by 
emphasizing that the State Department could still file suggestions of 
 
 77. Id. at 280. 
 78. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
 79. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694. 
 80. Id. at 695 (emphasis omitted) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 
480, 496–97 (1983)). 
 81. Id. at 696. 
 82. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 
(2003)). 
 83. Id. at 697–98 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1602 (2000)). 
 84. Id. at 699. 
 85. See infra Part IV.B. 
 86. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700. 
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immunity, it expressed no opinion as to whether courts should defer 
to such statements.87 
III.  CLARITY IN SOME AREAS, CONCERNS IN OTHERS 
Following its decision in Altmann, the Supreme Court quickly 
granted certiorari in four cases, vacating and remanding them to the 
courts of appeal for consideration in light of its holding.88 The Court’s 
clarification in Altmann of the scope of the FSIA’s reach will provide 
the lower courts with much-needed guidance. Already, the Second 
Circuit has applied Altmann in deciding a suit against a French 
national railroad company.89 
What is striking about Altmann is that it provokes such heated 
debate about whether retroactive application of the FSIA is 
consistent with the legal principles of retroactivity and the spirit of 
sovereign immunity. This Part argues that the holding in Altmann is 
wholly consistent with both. Unfortunately, for all its clarity, 
Altmann’s reference to the State Department’s ability to file 
suggestions of immunity has raised questions as to whether such 
involvement by the executive violates separation-of-power principles 
and contravenes one of the primary purposes of the FSIA—to 
remove political considerations from the immunity calculus. 
A. Altmann Resolves Interpretative Tensions between Retroactivity 
Principles and the Purpose of Sovereign Immunity 
At the heart of American law is a presumption against applying 
statutes retroactively. As the Court stated in INS v. St. Cyr,90 the 
“presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in 
[American] jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries 
older than our Republic.”91 Whether viewed simply as a presumption 
or a constitutional requirement, this general rule is supported by 
 
 87. Id. at 701–02. 
 88. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003), 
vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72 F. App’x 850 (2d 
Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004); Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004); Whiteman v. Republic of Austria, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19984 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004). 
 89. Abrams v. Société’ Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 90. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 91. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). 
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several rationales.92 The dominant rationale is a sense of fairness that 
drives courts to be cautious in applying laws that deprive citizens of 
the “opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their 
conduct accordingly.”93 The fear is that a retroactive statute disrupts 
“settled expectations”94 when it “takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a 
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past.”95 Another rationale for the rule centers 
on the Madisonian fear of legislatures using retroactive statutes to 
benefit the powerful and punish unpopular groups or individuals in 
society.96 Not all retroactive applications of statutes are impermissible, 
however. 
The Court in Landgraf set forth a two-prong test by which to 
determine whether a statute should apply retroactively.97 Courts 
should first examine whether the statute includes an express 
statement that Congress intended the statute to apply retroactively.98 
If such an express statement is present, then the statute may apply 
retroactively.99 In the absence of an express statement, courts need to 
determine whether retroactive application of the statute would affect 
“vested rights” or impose new obligations.100 If a statute does either, 
then it is considered “substantive” in nature and retroactive 
application of the statute would be impermissible under Landgraf.101 
In its Altmann decision, the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, 
that the FSIA does not include an express statement regarding its 
retroactive application and ultimately held that the FSIA should 
nonetheless apply retroactively because Austria could not have 
 
 92. Id. at 266 (noting several constitutional provisions that prohibit retroactive 
application). 
 93. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. 
 94. Id. at 266. 
 95. Id. at 269 (quoting Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 
767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)). 
 96. Id. at 266, 267 n.20. 
 97. Id. at 280. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 694 (2004) (“Under 
Landgraf, therefore, it is appropriate to ask whether the Act affects substantive rights . . . or 
addresses only matters of procedure . . . .”). 
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legitimately expected to receive immunity for its actions relating to 
the Klimt paintings.102 
The Court in Altmann did not simply affirm the Ninth Circuit’s 
judgment, but expressly—and properly—disagreed with its rote 
application of the Landgraf test.103 In deciding not to apply the 
Landgraf test to the FSIA, the Court visited two issues: (1) whether it 
is even possible to categorize the FSIA as a procedural or substantive 
statute, and (2) whether foreign states’ reliance interests have a place 
in the immunity calculus. 
1. A Definitional Dilemma: Is the FSIA Procedural or 
Substantive?  The Court’s discussion in Altmann regarding whether 
the FSIA is procedural or substantive will likely have a lasting effect 
on how lower courts decide other FSIA-related questions. Prior to 
Altmann, lower courts struggled in determining whether the FSIA 
should be viewed as a procedural statute or a substantive one. For 
example, the FSIA could be viewed as procedural in the sense that it 
contains “procedural provisions relating to venue, removal, 
execution, and attachment apply[ing] to all pending cases”104 and, as 
observed by one commentator, the FSIA 
removed the existing federal jurisdictional bases for suits against 
foreign sovereigns from a number of statutes, including [t]he Alien 
Tort Statute, Diversity Jurisdiction, Admiralty Jurisdiction, 
Interpleader, Commerce and Antitrust[,] and Patents, Copyrights 
and Trademarks, and placed the exclusive basis for federal 
jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns in the FSIA.105 
In another sense, however, the FSIA could be viewed as substantive 
in that it “does not merely concern access to the federal courts,” but 
“governs the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be 
held liable . . . in the United States . . . . [and] codifies the standards 
 
 102. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964–67 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 103. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (“[C]ontrary to the 
assumption of the District Court and Court of Appeals, the default rule announced in our 
opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products does not control the outcome in this case.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 104. Id. at 698. 
 105. Michael D. Murray, Stolen Art and Sovereign Immunity: The Case of Altmann v. 
Austria, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 301, 308 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive 
federal law.”106 
Altmann, however, concluded that “the FSIA defies such 
categorization”107 and found Landgraf’s procedural-substantive 
distinction too crude an instrument to determine whether the FSIA 
should apply retroactively. First, as the Court noted, the traditional 
presumption against retroactivity has its greatest analytical value 
when applied to private rights, which are rights tethered to reliance 
interests.108 The problem, as explained further in Section A.2, is that, 
although having a “reasonable expectation” of immunity, foreign 
states never had a “right” to such immunity.109 Second, Landgraf’s 
retroactivity analysis is inadequate in determining whether the FSIA 
is impermissibly retroactive because, even if the FSIA creates 
jurisdiction where there was none before,110 and thus is substantive, 
this “characteristic,” as the Court noted, “is in some tension with 
other, less substantive aspects” of the FSIA.111 
A primary purpose of the FSIA as a jurisdiction-allocating 
statute was to remove the case-by-case determinations that were 
being performed by the State Department. These changes did not 
deprive foreign states of “settled expectations” from suit, and thus 
affect substantive rights, but rather clarified the terms under which 
immunity would or would not be granted.112 The Court declared that 
 
 106. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 107. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694. 
 108. Id. at 696. 
 109. See infra Part III.A.2 for an explanation why the Court properly affirmed the principle 
that sovereign immunity is rooted in comity rather than in the Constitution). 
 110. This was an argument raised by the Republic of Austria, Reply Brief of Republic of 
Austria at 5, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), 2004 WL 114700, at *5, and endorsed by the 
dissent, see Altmann, 541 U.S. at 723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (conceding that the FSIA is 
jurisdictional in nature, but also arguing that it has an impermissible retroactive effect because it 
“create[s] jurisdiction where there was none before”). 
 111. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696 n.15. 
 112. As one commentator has noted, prior to the FSIA’s enactment, “[r]ecommendations of 
the State Department were not consistently made—sometimes a negative recommendation was 
made . . . [and a] favorable suggestion of immunity depended on the good will and good 
relations between the United States and the foreign sovereign at the time of the suit.” Michael 
D. Murray, Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi War Crimes of 
Plunder and Expropriation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 271 (2004). Thus, the FSIA’s 
codification of restrictive sovereign immunity did not “divest foreign states of settled 
expectations,” but rather “clarified unsettled and uncertain expectations as to whether the state 
of relations between the foreign state and the United States at the time of suit [was favorable].” 
Id. at 279. 
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the FSIA was neither solely procedural in nature nor solely 
substantive, despite a prior pronouncement that statutes, “even 
[when] phrased in ‘jurisdictional’ terms, [are] as much subject to our 
presumption against retroactivity as any other.”113 In highlighting the 
seemingly procedural and substantive aspects of the FSIA, the 
Court’s opinion offers lowers courts an important explanation as to 
why the FSIA merits a different inquiry than the one put forth in 
Landgraf. 
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Right Based in Comity, Not 
the Constitution.  Both commentators114 and courts115 have frequently 
argued, almost reflexively, that foreign states have expectations of 
immunity. This is understandable for a number of reasons. First, the 
Supreme Court, in addition to its general hesitancy to expand federal 
court jurisdiction, has indicated that prior to 1952 foreign states did 
have an expectation of sovereign immunity. Second, the United 
States—acting through the State Department—has repeatedly 
observed that foreign states do rely on immunity. There is a general 
understanding within the international community that provisions of 
the FSIA should not have retroactive effect, particularly given that 
the United States has entered into many agreements with foreign 
nations “against the background assumption that [they will not] be 
sued in United States courts.”116 
These reasons are, of course, understandable, and Altmann 
certainly did not give them short shrift. The only problem is that, 
when extended too far, they lead ultimately to a faulty conclusion: 
that foreign states have a “right” to immunity from suit. No such right 
 
 113. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1977) 
(emphases omitted). 
 114. See, e.g., Adam K.A. Mortara, The Case Against Retroactive Application of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 267 (2001) (“The FSIA also abridges 
what is arguably an antecedent right: that of sovereign immunity.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (“We believe, as did the district court, that ‘[o]nly after 1952 was it reasonable for a 
foreign sovereign to anticipate being sued in the United States courts on commercial 
transactions.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Jackson v. People’s Republic of 
China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (11th Cir. 1986) (“We agree that to give the Act retrospective 
application to pre-1952 events would interfere with antecedent rights of other sovereigns . . . .”). 
 116. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17–18, Altmann, 
541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13); see also ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 
152 (2001) (providing an interesting discussion of the State Department’s unwavering 
institutional commitment to preserving the full scope of sovereign immunity). 
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exists. Foreign sovereign immunity has always been rooted in comity, 
not in the Constitution.117 In rejecting the Landgraf inquiry, the Court 
properly clarified for lower courts how the principles of sovereign 
immunity informed its decision that the FSIA was meant by Congress 
to be applied retroactively. 
Beginning with The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that sovereign immunity is a privilege extended by one 
sovereign to another simply in the spirit of comity, and always 
capable of being withdrawn.118 Sovereign immunity differs from other 
status-based rights to immunity. Whereas legislative immunity, 
judicial immunity, and presidential immunity have been designed to 
shield legislators, judges, and the executive from the chilling effects 
that litigation can have on their duties,119 sovereign immunity is not 
designed to protect the duties or expectations of foreign states.  
Rather, its function is only ‘‘to give foreign states and their 
instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit as a 
gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns.’’120  
B. Post-Altmann Sovereign Immunity Determinations: Revival of 
Executive Suggestion? 
In holding in Altmann that the FSIA was meant to apply in all 
cases, the Court sought to convey the important message that 
retroactive application of the FSIA was consistent with and in 
furtherance of one of its primary goals—to remove political 
considerations from the immunity calculus. Unfortunately, the Court 
did not stop there. Although in one breath it expressly rejected the 
historical inquiry that the Ninth Circuit and other courts had used to 
determine how a foreign state would have been treated by the State 
Department at the time of the conduct in question, in the next it 
 
 117. See The Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (“[A]ll 
sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar 
circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories 
which sovereignty confers.”). 
 118. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
 119. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (noting that “[t]he 
immunities for government officers prevent the threat of suit from ‘crippling the proper and 
effective administration of public affairs’” (citations omitted)). 
 120. Id.  See also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004) (“[T]he principal 
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has never been to permit foreign states and their 
instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit 
in United States courts.”).  
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invited the State Department to resume its practice of filing 
suggestions of immunity in FSIA cases. Nothing in the opinion 
expressly invited the State Department to make such filings; the 
Court simply noted that “nothing in [its] holding prevents the State 
Department from filing statements of interest.”121 The implication, 
however, is that courts may, just as they did prior to the “Tate 
Letter,” defer to the judgment of the State Department regarding 
foreign states’ immunity. Such intervention by the executive branch 
raises serious separation-of-powers concerns and diminishes the 
overall clarity that Altmann has otherwise provided.122 
A driving force behind enactment of the FSIA was a need to 
relieve the executive branch from the obligation to take a position in 
politically sensitive sovereign immunity determinations.123 Altmann’s 
announcement that the State Department may file suggestions of 
immunity represented a departure from the very purpose of the 
FSIA. It placed courts in a “middle position”124 between choosing to 
apply the “neutral principles”125 set forth in the FSIA and choosing to 
invite the State Department to file statements of interest in immunity 
determinations. In so doing, the Court raised a serious separation-of-
powers question: can the foreign affairs power of the executive 
supersede a statutory scheme set forth by Congress?126 The Court’s 
revival of executive suggestion may also complicate foreign policy.127 
With Altmann’s endorsement of executive suggestion, foreign states 
facing jurisdiction in American courts are likely to resume lobbying 
the State Department to file suggestions of immunity—precisely the 
activity Congress sought to eliminate in enacting the FSIA. 
 
 121. Id. at 701. 
 122. The majority’s discussion of the use of the State Department’s views in sovereign 
immunity determinations was also criticized as being extraneous to the only question presented: 
whether provisions of the FSIA should be applied retroactively. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J. 
dissenting). 
 123. See supra Part I.B. 
 124. See Leading Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 466, 474 (2004) (discussing how the Court 
adopted a “middle position” that raised a “fundamental separation-of-powers question at the 
root of the tension between sovereign immunity principles and practice”). 
 125. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702 n.23. 
 126. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 127. See id. at 715 (“[T]he ultimate effect of the Court’s inviting foreign nations to pressure 
the Executive is to risk inconsistent results for private citizens who sue, based on changes and 
nuances in foreign affairs, and to add prospective instability to the most sensitive area of foreign 
relations.”). 
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Most disturbingly, as both the dissent in Altmann and several 
commentators have demonstrated, a powerful criticism of the Court’s 
injection of executive suggestions into the immunity calculus is that 
such suggestions will lead to a patchwork of conflicting approaches in 
the lower courts as judges struggle to balance the neutral principles of 
the FSIA with competing political pressures from the State 
Department. The Court’s refusal to explain the extent to which a 
court should defer to a suggestion of immunity leaves important 
questions unresolved and may “set in motion the gears to generate a 
case . . . in which the neutral principles of the FSIA authorized 
jurisdiction, but the State Department filed a politically based 
suggestion for immunity ‘which, by its insistence, superseded the 
statute’s directive.’”128 
IV.  ASSESSING THE DAMAGE: WHAT DOES  
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION REALLY MEAN FOR PLAINTIFFS, 
FOREIGN STATES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT? 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann to apply the FSIA to 
all claims against foreign governments, regardless of when the 
underlying facts occurred, represents a significant development in 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Besides questions as to how this 
decision comports with retroactivity principles or the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, a more practical question naturally emerges: 
what does Altmann mean for plaintiffs, foreign states, and the State 
Department? 
A. For Plaintiffs, a “Positive,” but Measured, Development 
When the Court ruled last term that Maria Altmann’s suit could 
proceed, there was a flood of news coverage discussing how the 
decision would bring other Holocaust-era suits against foreign 
governments to U.S. courts.129 Whether many of these claims will 
prove to be viable is a different question. 
 
 128. Leading Case, supra note 124, at 474 (citations omitted). 
 129. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Suit Against Austria to Regain Art, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A20 (“[T]he decision may open the door to additional World War II-era 
lawsuits, but the category of cases the decision will actually assist is likely to be small.”); Henry 
Weinstein, Woman Can Sue Austria Over Art Seized by Nazis: Supreme Court Ruling May 
Encourage Others to Go After Governments for Disputed Property, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at 
A1 (“Altmann’s victory may open courtrooms for other Holocaust survivors and heirs of people 
who perished.”). 
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The filing of suits against foreign governments for Holocaust-era 
expropriations and wrongs has been hailed as a “positive 
development,” a testament to the strength of the U.S. legal system 
and an important, potentially final opportunity for elderly survivors 
to seek redress when all other options have proved impossible.130 
Some commentators have viewed the issues raised in Altmann within 
the wider context of human rights litigation.131 For example, one 
commentator said the Court’s decision to uphold federal court 
jurisdiction over Austria constituted “judicial affirmation” of the 
principles set forth at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era 
Assets.132 Another commentator noted that the Ninth Circuit’s review 
of Maria Altmann’s case was saturated with moral and emotional 
overtones,133 with the court phrasing its central question as “whether 
Austria would have been entitled to immunity for its alleged 
complicity in the pillaging and retention of treasured paintings from 
the home of a Jewish alien who was forced to flee for his life.”134 
Indeed, even Maria Altmann argued that the Supreme Court must 
consider the issue of the FSIA’s retroactivity in her case against a 
“historical backdrop” in which the United States made clear to 
Austria that Nazi-looted artwork should be returned to its rightful 
 
 130. See, e.g., BAZYLER, supra note 2, at xii–xiii (discussing the unique aspects of 
American legal culture that have made it possible for Holocaust-era claims to be heard). 
 131. See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, The ‘Last Prisoners of War’: Unrestituted Nazi-Looted Art, 6 
U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 81, 95 (2004) (arguing that Altmann speaks to “the ability of 
American courts to make a valuable contribution in achieving Holocaust-era justice”); Andrzej 
R. Niekrasz, Comment, The Past is Another Country: Against the Retroactive Applicability of the 
Foreign Immunities Act to Pre-1952 Conduct, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2004) (“The 
issue of the retroactive applicability of the FSIA is clearly controversial in this age of importing 
global human rights litigation to the American civil justice system.”); Svetlana Shirinova, 
Comment, Challenges to Establishing Jurisdiction Over Holocaust Era Claims in Federal Court, 
34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 159, 190 (2004) (“Resolving [Altmann’s and] the remaining 
Holocaust Era cases will demonstrate to the world that the United States is still devoted to 
fighting genocide and will not tolerate injustice.”). 
 132. Yonover, supra note 131, at 95. The “Washington Principles,” as they are known, were 
agreed to by forty-five nations and a number of nongovernmental organizations at a conference 
sponsored by the State Department in 1998. Although the principles are nonbinding, signatory 
nations (which include Austria) have agreed, among other things, to identify Nazi-confiscated 
artworks that have not been restituted and to develop alternative dispute-resolution 
mechanisms for resolving ownership questions. U.S. State Dep’t, Washington Conference 
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/23231.htm. 
 133. Shirinova, supra note 131, at 183–84. 
 134. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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owners.135 The Altmann case and similar cases against foreign states 
are, understandably, rooted in hopes that elderly Holocaust survivors 
will finally have their day in court. 
Although Altmann does represent a significant development in 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence and removes a hurdle for plaintiffs 
bringing suits based on pre-1952 events, it is important to recall the 
narrowness of the Court’s holding.136 The Court never decided 
whether the particular exception at issue, expropriation under § 
1605(a)(3), was properly raised by the facts.137 The Court also did not 
decide whether Austria could successfully invoke substantive 
defenses to Altmann’s claim.138 And by almost every account, 
Altmann’s case presented a very unusual set of facts, a point 
recognized even by Altmann herself.139 No executive agreement or 
treaty between Austria and the United States discernibly conflicted 
with federal court jurisdiction.140 Also, Altmann did try to sue in 
Austria, but the two million dollar filing fee was prohibitive.141 Austria 
also had a thirty-day statute of limitations period, which would have 
effectively barred her suit.142 When the suit was brought in the United 
States, Altmann’s attorney expressed willingness to return to an 
Austrian court if Austria would agree to drop the statute of 
limitations defense, which Austria refused to do.143 It was only 
 
 135. See Brief for Respondent at 6–8, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) 
(No. 03-13) (detailing various pronouncements by the United States that served to put the 
Republic of Austria on notice that individual claims could be made for Nazi-looted property). 
 136. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700. 
 137. Id. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ biggest hurdle on remand may very well be presenting facts 
that satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to the FSIA. Altmann addressed only the issue of 
the FSIA’s retroactive application. It did not alter the stringency with which courts would assess 
whether facts support application of one of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity. Even Judge 
Wald, whose persuasive dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994), argued that the FSIA should be interpreted to include an implied waiver exception 
for jus cogens violations, recognized that the particular exception at issue, § 1605(a)(1), would 
still have to be interpreted narrowly to avoid judicial interference with matters involving 
sensitive foreign relations. Id. at 1184–85 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
 138. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700–01. 
 139. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 43 (“This case presents a complex 
combination of somewhat unique facts and legal issues that is sui generis and not likely to be 
repeated in other cases.”). 
 140. Id. at 41. 
 141. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 245. 
 142. Id. at 247. 
 143. Id. at 247–48. 
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because of Austria’s excessive filing fee and difficult statute of 
limitations that Altmann brought suit in the United States.144 
In addition to the narrowness of the Altmann decision and the 
unique factual circumstances involved, the Court’s analytical 
approach is significant because it illustrates the purely jurisdictional 
nature of the FSIA and the dispassionate analysis that should 
accompany immunity determinations.145 By holding that the FSIA’s 
sovereign immunity rules should be applied in all cases, regardless of 
when the underlying conduct occurred, the Court’s primary aim was 
not to send a social message but rather to offer lower courts clear 
instructions regarding how such immunity determinations should be 
made. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Altmann case focused on 
whether Austria could have reasonably expected to receive 
immunity.146 In so doing, the court precisely endorsed the approach 
used by the dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,147 in 
which Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit, after reviewing the outcome of 
the Nuremberg trial, concluded that “[i]n the mid-1940s, Germany 
could not, even in its wildest dreams, have expected the executive 
branch of the United States, as a matter of grace and comity, to 
suggest immunity for its enslavement and confinement (in three 
concentration camps) of an American citizen during the 
Holocaust.”148 This kind of “historical inquiry” into foreign-states’ 
expectations of immunity was expressly rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Altmann.149 
Altmann, although generally a positive development for 
plaintiffs, was not intended to encourage human rights litigation in 
federal courts. Rather, the case is significant for the clear instruction 
it has provided to lower courts: apply the FSIA’s provisions to all 
 
 144. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 6 (“Indeed, it was only because of an 
oppressive filing fee requirement ($2 million) and a more difficult (although, according to 
Austria, not insurmountable) statute of limitations standard that Mrs. Altmann did not bring 
her suit in Austria.” (citation omitted)). 
 145. Even Altmann’s attorney recognized that the question of whether the FSIA could be 
applied retroactively was one that could be decided “through a dispassionate analysis of the 
statute in question, [the] Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and the legal relationship between 
the parties to this case.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 2. 
 146. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 147. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 148. Id. at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
 149. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004). 
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cases regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. A recent 
post-Altmann case, Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer 
Francais,150 did exactly this; it exhibits how Altmann is not necessarily 
a windfall for plaintiffs. 
Abrams involved a suit by Holocaust survivors and their heirs 
against a French national railroad company that was alleged to have 
committed crimes against humanity and violated customary 
international law by transporting thousands of French Jews to slave 
labor camps.151 At the time of these acts, the railroad company was 
privately owned, but it had been acquired in whole by the French 
government in 1983.152 The plaintiffs brought a number of claims and, 
invoking international law and the Alien Tort Claims Act,153 sought 
jurisdiction in a U.S. federal district court.154 Unlike many other 
FSIA-related cases, it was the plaintiffs arguing that the FSIA could 
not be applied retroactively and that the French national railroad 
company was, thus, not immune because it was privately owned at the 
time of the Holocaust.155 The District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York disagreed, holding that the FSIA does apply to pre-1952 
events and that the French national railroad company was immune 
because it was now a wholly owned instrumentality156 of the state.157 
Although the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
railroad was an instrumentality of France, it vacated the dismissal and 
remanded the case because there was insufficient information as to 
how the State Department, during World War II, would have 
assessed the significance of the railroad’s corporate form in an 
immunity determination.158 This information, the Second Circuit 
reasoned, was significant in determining whether the State 
Department would have recognized immunity in such a case as the 
 
 150. 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 151. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 152. Id. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 154. Abrams, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 433. 
 155. Id. at 426. 
 156.  The FSIA applies to any “instrumentality” or “agency” of a foreign state that is a 
separate legal entity and is an organ or political subdivision of a foreign state, or when a 
majority of its shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or one of its 
political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2000). 
 157. Id. at 450. 
 158. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173, 188 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
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plaintiffs’ and whether the plaintiffs’ expectation that they could 
litigate their claim against the railroad in the United States was 
legitimate.159 
 The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and 
remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding in 
Altmann.160 In late 2004, on remand, the Second Circuit dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ suit.161 Following the rule articulated by the Court in Dole 
Food Co. v. Patrickson,162  which held that an entity’s status as an 
instrumentality of the state is determined at the time the suit is filed 
and not when the conduct occurred,163 the Second Circuit ruled that 
the French national railroad was, indeed, an instrumentality of France 
at the time the complaint was filed and, thus, was immune from suit.164 
Whether the railroad would have been treated as a corporate entity 
or government entity during the war, the Second Circuit said that this 
was now irrelevant under Altmann and that it was unnecessary to 
inquire into the State Department’s views.165 
Interestingly, the Second Circuit concluded its analysis by noting 
that it was 
bound by [Altmann] to defer to comity rather than to approach the 
situation from the perspective of the injured plaintiffs whose rights 
have now been altered. Accordingly, the evil actions of the French 
national railroad’s former private masters in knowingly transporting 
thousands to death camps during World War II are not susceptible 
to legal redress in federal court today, because defendant has since 
become a part of the French government and is therefore 
immunized from suit by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 
Nonetheless, the railroad’s conduct at the time lives on in infamy.166 
As this language suggests, Altmann advanced dispassion and clarity 
over redress of past wrongs. Moreover, it effectively addressed critics’ 
arguments that immunity determinations were being made out of a 
“judicial impulse toward plaintiff-oriented equity,” “judicial 
 
 159. Id. 
 160.  Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrams, 124 S. Ct. 2834, 2834 (2004). 
 161.  Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 64–65 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 162. 538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
 163.  Id. at 478. 
 164.  Abrams, 389 F.3d at 64–65.  
 165.  Id.  
 166. Id. at 64–65. 
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activism,” and “judicial creativity in refusing to dismiss World War 
II–related actions.”167 Although Altmann may be a significant 
development for plaintiffs, retroactive application of the FSIA can 
also cut both ways, as Abrams shows. 
B. For Foreign States, a Serious Setback? 
When the district court denied Austria’s motion to dismiss Maria 
Altmann’s suit, the “effect was that for the first time in the United 
States a foreign country was being forced to go to trial in an 
American court on a claim alleging failure to return to its proper 
owners a Nazi-stolen artwork.”168 Naturally, foreign states saw the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann as important because it 
represented a significant shift in American foreign sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence and, potentially, “open[ed] the floodgates” 
for more litigation against foreign states relating to Holocaust-era 
wrongs.169 Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Mexico, in 
its amicus brief, declared that its “interest in the proper resolution of 
this case [was] not theoretical,” noting that it had been sued in recent 
years in American courts and that, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Altmann, it had been “forced to relitigate the issue of its immunity 
for pre-1952 events under the amorphous retroactivity standard that 
the Ninth Circuit adopted.”170 
Despite this parade of horribles,171 foreign states’ fears should be 
allayed for several reasons. Specifically, the unique facts underlying 
Altmann’s claims; the Court’s explicit rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s 
“unmanageable”172 case-by-case historical inquiry into whether a 
foreign state would have been accorded immunity at a particular 
 
 167. Niekrasz, supra note 131, at 1338, 1353–1354. One view is that courts were failing to 
properly apply the FSIA by keeping World War II–related cases in federal courts because of the 
morally and politically sensitive nature of such claims. Id. 
 168. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 246. 
 169. Murray, supra note 105, at 319 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 42–46, Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13)); Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 42–43. 
 170. Brief for Mexico as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at *1 (citing 
Cruz v. United States, Nos. C-02-1942-CRB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10948, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. 
June 20, 2003).  
 171. Murray, supra note 105, at 319 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 42–46); 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 44. 
 172. This is how Austria characterized the outcome for other immunity determinations if 
the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over Austria was affirmed. Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 169, at 42–46. 
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time; and the range of defenses under the FSIA that are unaffected 
by the Court’s holding in Altmann—including the act-of-state, 
political question, and forum non conveniens doctrines—all indicate 
that foreign states need not be concerned that Altmann will greatly 
expand their liability. This Section reviews three important defenses, 
arguing that Altmann does not represent as big a setback as some 
foreign states have argued. 
One option, as the Court in Altmann explicitly mentioned,173 is 
that a foreign state may still invoke a substantive defense that its 
actions fall under the act-of-state doctrine and, therefore, that the 
legality of its public domestic acts cannot be questioned in a foreign 
court. This doctrine reflects a recognition that “juridical review of 
acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of 
foreign relations by the political branches of the government.”174 In 
Underhill v. Hernandez,175 the Court provided the classic formulation 
of this doctrine: 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its 
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be 
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign 
powers as between themselves.176 
Like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the act-of-state doctrine 
derives “from the thoroughly sound principle that on occasion 
individual litigants may have to forgo decision on the merits of their 
claims because the involvement of the courts in such a decision might 
frustrate the conduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.”177 Unlike the 
 
 173. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) (“Unlike a claim of sovereign 
immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign 
states with a substantive defense on the merits. Under that doctrine, the courts of one state will 
not question the validity of public acts (acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns within 
their own borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of 
the litigants has standing to challenge those acts”). 
 174. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972). 
 175. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
 176. Id. at 252. 
 177. First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 769. The Ninth Circuit, in International Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cogently summarized 
the separation of powers and judicial economy concerns raised by suits against foreign states: 
The doctrine recognizes the institutional limitations of the courts and the peculiar 
requirements of successful foreign relations. To participate adeptly in the global 
community, the United States must speak with one voice and pursue a careful and 
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the act-of-state doctrine is a 
“rule of decision.”178 It is prudential rather than jurisdictional, 
meaning that federal courts enjoy considerable flexibility in 
determining whether to defer, for reasons such as comity, to the 
executive branch’s assessment of when application of the doctrine 
would advance the interests of the United States.179 Despite this 
important distinction between the two doctrines, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity as codified in the FSIA “in no way affects 
existing law on the extent to which, if at all, the ‘act of state’ doctrine 
may be applicable”—a point stressed by the Court most recently in 
Altmann.180 For Austria, this pronouncement means that it likely can 
assert title to the Klimt paintings because the nationalization or 
expropriation constituted a public act (jure imperii) that U.S. courts 
may not review, because the act-of-state doctrine “precludes [U.S.] 
courts . . . from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a 
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own 
territory.”181 For other foreign states, the significance is that the Court 
 
deliberate foreign policy. The political branches of our government are able to 
consider the competing economic and political considerations and respond to the 
public will in order to carry on foreign relations in accordance with the best interests 
of the country as a whole. The courts, in contrast, focus on single disputes and make 
decisions on the basis of legal principles. The timing of our decisions is largely a result 
of our caseload and of the random tactical considerations which motivate parties to 
bring lawsuits and to seek delay or expedition. When the courts engage in piecemeal 
adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they risk disruption of our 
country’s international diplomacy. The executive may utilize protocol, economic 
sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Ill-
timed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify these tools 
and embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world. 
Id. at 1358. 
 178. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). 
 179. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–23, 438 (1964); see also First 
Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768 (“We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it 
is with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the 
Court that application of the act-of-state doctrine would not advance the interests of American 
foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts.”); Bernstein v. N.V. 
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375, 375–76 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting the State 
Department’s policy of “reliev[ing] American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of 
their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials”). 
 180. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 713 (2004) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1359 (rejecting the view that the act-of-state 
doctrine has been superceded by the FSIA and noting that Congress, in enacting the FSIA, 
recognized the distinction between that statute and the doctrine and “found it unnecessary to 
address” how the FSIA affected the act-of-state doctrine) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 20 
n.1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6619 n.1)). 
 181. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 41. But see Yonover, supra note 131, at 92 (arguing that the act-
of-state doctrine would not even apply in this case because the doctrine “applies only when the 
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has left untouched a substantive defense that, despite various 
restrictions imposed by Congress and the Court,182 is an effective basis 
for dismissing suits involving foreign states, particularly when the 
State Department cautions a court against proceeding.183 
Additionally, the FSIA does not preclude a foreign state from 
moving for dismissal on the ground that a case presents a 
nonjusticiable political question. The purpose of the political question 
doctrine is to avoid review of cases that are simply too “political” and 
that are most appropriately resolved by the legislative and executive 
branches.184 Like the act-of-state doctrine, its applicability is without 
clear definition. In the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, the Court noted 
several characteristics of a nonjusticiable political question, with 
dismissal appropriate when any one of these is “inextricable from the 
case at bar.”185 On occasion, courts have invoked one or more of the 
 
foreign government involved is still ‘extant and recognized by’ the United States at the time of 
the lawsuit” and, given that the Nazis annexed Austria in 1938, “a court could conclude that 
Austria was not the sovereign acting at the time of the taking of the property and, more 
importantly, the Nazi regime that looted the property no longer exists” (citation omitted)). The 
success of an act-of-state defense by Austria would of course depend on whether the State 
Department counsels for application of the doctrine. See First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768. 
Austria’s defense under this doctrine would also be precluded if its acts with respect to the 
Klimt paintings were found to be commercial in nature. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. 
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976) (refusing to extend the act-of-state doctrine to a 
foreign nation’s commercial activities). 
 182. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 706 (emphasizing that the act-of-state 
doctrine does not apply to the commercial activities of a foreign government); First Nat’l City 
Bank, 406 U.S. at 770 (stating that the act-of-state doctrine should not be applied against the 
wishes of the executive branch); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 374 
(4th ed. 2003) (noting certain circumstances, under 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e), in which courts may not 
decline judicial review on the basis of the act-of-state doctrine). 
 183. Although the State Department did not recommend against the district court’s 
adjudication of the dispute in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 
U.S. 400 (1990), the Third Circuit’s decision in that case is an illustration of how federal courts, 
although not bound by the State Department’s legal opinions, nonetheless give “substantial 
respect” to its concerns in determining how a civil suit involving a foreign state should proceed. 
Envtl. Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 184. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Not every case that “touches [upon] foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,” however, given that the justiciability inquiry is limited 
to “‘political questions,’ not . . . ‘political cases.’” Id. at 211, 217. 
 185. Id. at 217. The factors Baker listed as characteristics of a political question are the 
following: (1) a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department,” (2) a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it,” (3) the “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” (4) the “impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” (5) 
an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” or (6) the 
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Baker factors in dismissing suits in the area of foreign affairs, with the 
rationale mostly centering on lack of expertise or fear of interfering 
with the political branches. When courts are faced with suits brought 
against foreign states, they frequently dismiss them as nonjusticiable 
political questions, particularly if the cases involve statements of 
interest from the executive.186 In Altmann, the State Department filed 
no such statement; one can only speculate as to whether the district 
court would have dismissed the case as invoking a political question if 
it had. For foreign states fearing enhanced exposure to liability in 
American courts in the wake of Altmann, the cases since the Supreme 
Court’s decision that have been dismissed as involving political 
questions demonstrate that the political question doctrine remains a 
potent defense for foreign states.187 
Finally, foreign states may still move to dismiss suits brought 
under the FSIA on a forum non conveniens ground. This doctrine 
allows federal courts to decline jurisdiction if bringing suit in another 
forum would be more convenient for the parties and would better 
advance the interest of justice.188 Factors relevant to a court’s 
determination whether to dismiss a case under forum non conveniens 
include the availability of an adequate alternative forum; “private 
interest” factors, such as the litigant’s relative ease of access to 
evidence, availability of process to compel attendance, and the cost of 
 
“potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question.” Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo., 218 
F.3d 152, 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the executive that a dispute concerning 
successor states to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia involved nonjusticiable political 
questions); Anderman v. Federal Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1113–14 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (finding that a class action suit against Austria was inextricable from at least four of the 
Baker factors and agreeing with the executive that retaining jurisdiction over the suit would 
interfere with an executive agreement between Austria and the United States); Joo v. Japan, 
172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that “to some extent each of the factors 
identified in Baker [was] inextricable from the present case” and agreeing with the executive 
that there was a political question in light of treaties and agreements negotiated with Japan after 
World War II). 
 187. See Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of a complaint as 
presenting a nonjusticiable political question); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal under the political question doctrine of certain claims by 
Holocaust survivors alleging human rights violations based on the Vatican Bank’s alleged 
assistance to the Croatian Ustasha political regime); Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 
320 F. Supp. 2d 235, 235 (D.N.J. 2004) (ruling that the political question doctrine necessitated 
dismissal of a suit against a German-instrumentality foundation and German corporations for 
their complicity in exploiting the plaintiffs as slave laborers during the Holocaust). ‘ 
 188. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). 
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obtaining attendance of witnesses; and “public factors,” such as court 
congestion, the local interest in the litigation, the avoidance of 
conflict-of-law problems, and the unfairness of burdening a jury in an 
unrelated forum.189 Dismissal of suits against foreign states under 
forum non conveniens is common and, as one commentator notes, 
advisable to avoid risks of jurisdictional and diplomatic friction and to 
decrease the potential for unenforceable judgments.190 
These common defenses limit federal jurisdiction over suits 
against foreign states and suggest that, even with Altmann’s 
endorsement of the FSIA’s retroactive applicability, foreign states are 
unlikely to be exposed to a significantly greater number of suits. 
C. For the State Department, Deep Concerns 
As Part III.B highlighted, there are serious concerns that 
Altmann’s extension of the FSIA to pre-1952 conduct and, in 
particular, its implicit invitation to the State Department to file 
suggestions of immunity, may complicate American foreign policy in 
three key ways. First, the State Department considers Holocaust-era 
suits against foreign governments as upsetting the various legislative 
and diplomatic arrangements that the United States has made with 
other nations to provide restitution or compensation schemes.191 
Second, the State Department fears that Altmann might encourage 
foreign states to pass “mirror-image laws,” subjecting the United 
States to increased foreign jurisdiction.192 As explained earlier, there 
are a number of reasons, including the fact-specific narrowness of the 
Altmann holding and the range of defenses that remain available to 
foreign states, which suggest that these fears are probably overblown. 
The third major concern of the State Department is more 
troubling. Altmann’s apparent reference to the State Department’s 
ability to file suggestions of immunity may lead to a spate of lobbying 
 
 189. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 255 n.22 (1981); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 
508–09. 
 190. Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the International 
Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 239, 277 
(2004). 
 191. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28, Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22811828, at *28. 
 192. Id. at *29; see also Weinstein, supra note 129, at A1 (reporting the concern of Stuart E. 
Eizenstat, former U.S. deputy treasury secretary, that Altmann “might prompt other countries 
‘to pass mirror-image laws’ that allow their citizens to sue the U.S. government for alleged 
wrongdoing”). 
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by foreign states seeking dismissal of claims, putting the United States 
government in an awkward position.193 As argued earlier, the Court’s 
reference to suggestions of immunity distracts from the clarity that 
Altmann has otherwise provided. Indeed, this reference was “wholly 
unnecessary” given the other measures available to courts (for 
example, the act-of-state and political question doctrines) and likely 
“adds very little (if anything) to the Executive’s ability to influence 
the dismissal of cases involving foreign sovereigns.”194 The State 
Department, in light of Altmann, may very well choose not to file any 
suggestions of immunity so as to discourage lobbying efforts by 
foreign states. This would be consistent with the State Department’s 
pre-Altmann policy of not filing suggestions of immunity on behalf of 
foreign states, which has been in effect since the FSIA’s enactment in 
1976.195 Thus, although Altmann appears to have implicitly 
resurrected suggestions of immunity, they will probably appear only 
rarely in practice. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s reference to suggestions of immunity is 
unfortunate. Although the Second Circuit did not find it as troubling 
as many commentators have,196 the Ninth Circuit did. In Alperin v. 
Vatican Bank,197 the Ninth Circuit struggled to determine how it 
should interpret those instances in which the State Department 
remains silent in a particular dispute since, after Altmann, courts are 
permitted to give deference to the “considered judgment of the 
Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.”198 The court 
lamented that 
[i]t is unclear . . . how courts should construe executive silence. We 
are not mind readers. And, thus, we cannot discern whether the 
 
 193. Owen Paul & Karen Asner, The Long Arm of the Law, LEGAL WK., July 15, 2004, 
http://www.legalweek.com/ViewItem.asp?id=20659&Keyword=owen. 
 194. Leading Case, supra note 124, at 475–76. 
 195. See 75 DEP’T ST. BULL. 649, 649 (1976) (“The Department of State will not make any 
sovereign immunity determinations after the effective date of [the FSIA]. Indeed, it would be 
inconsistent with the legislative intent of that Act for the Executive Branch to file any 
suggestion of immunity on or after January 19, 1977.”). 
 196. See Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 63–64 (2d. 
Cir. 2004) (noting that Altmann’s sanctioning of State Department involvement is limited to 
only certain circumstances, such as “when a court has subject matter jurisdiction and yet there is 
still strong executive interest in granting immunity or there is an ambiguity regarding an FSIA 
exception”). 
 197. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 198. Id. at 556 (quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004)). 
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State Department’s decision not to intervene is an implicit 
endorsement, an objection, or simple indifference.199 
The Supreme Court could, and should, resolve the confusion it has 
created by elaborating further upon the specific—and rare—
circumstances in which the State Department may intervene with a 
suggestion of immunity. The Court should also thoroughly explain the 
level of deference that courts should afford to such suggestions and 
offer guidance to lower courts trying to make sense of those situations 
in which the State Department provides only silence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann 
to apply the FSIA to all claims against foreign states, regardless of 
when the events giving rise to the claim occurred, represents a 
significant development in sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The 
Court’s thorough treatment of the FSIA, in light of retroactivity and 
sovereign immunity principles, will likely provide lower courts with 
much-needed clarity in future immunity determinations. Although 
Altmann may be viewed as a blessing for plaintiffs and a burden for 
foreign states, this Note has attempted to show how Altmann’s 
interpretation of the FSIA will likely produce less dramatic results 
than some have expected. Given that the decision brought clarity to 
the question of the FSIA’s retroactive application, however, the 
Court’s invitation to the State Department to issue suggestions of 
immunity is disappointing. Although in practice these suggestions of 
immunity are likely to be rare, the Court should consider clarifying 
the precise circumstances in which these suggestions might be made 
and the level of deference, if any, that courts should give them. 
 
 199. Id. 
